Posted 14 November 2005

History has a useful debunking function. For teachers who feel that their pupils are a little too smug about the mess America got herself into in Vietnam, and more especially if they harbour the illusion that the UK government was more astute than Kennedy’s Camelot, Peter Busch’s study is a useful corrective. There is a myth that the UK worked for peace in South East Asia and tried hard to convey its “imperial” wisdom to its impetuous American successor. Unfortunately, the archival record suggests that British diplomacy was more effective in bequeathing imperialism than wisdom.

Busch’s main points are that either directly through its contacts with Washington or indirectly through the Canadian and Indian members of the International Control Commission on Vietnam, the British not only opposed negotiations but strengthened the view that military force was the only way to stop the dominos toppling in Indo-China.

There is a troubling echo of the present in Busch’s account of how British ministers and officials convinced themselves that the only way to maintain British influence in the world was to woo the US administration through offers of support and emphasizing a common outlook and a common enemy. Again it is unclear what Britain gained from this approach, but it certainly did not provide the basis in trust or influence for Harold Wilson’s later attempts to advise Lyndon Johnson. Like most monographs, this is perhaps best suited for the teachers’ library rather than for A level students, but it could bolster a good long essay on Kennedy and Vietnam.

Buy this book now from Amazon